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1.  Introduction
The theory  of industrial  organization  has exerted  a strong  inf±sence  on
trade  theory  and  commercial  policy  in  recent  years. At a  theoretical  level,  the
welfare  implications  of  trade  policy  in  the  presence  of  unexploited  economies  of
scale, exit and entry barriers,  and oligopolistic  markets are now better
understood.  Concurrent  with  the  flow  of  new  theoretical  contributions, 1 a  number
of  case  studies,  mostly  partial  equilibrium,  have  sought  to  evaluate  the  welfare
and resouvce  allocation  effects  of trade  liberalization  in sectors  like  autos
where  the  above characteristics  are  an  important feature of  industrial
organization. 2 Most case  studies  have  been  for  developed  countries,  yet  it is
in developing  countries,  particularly  the  emerging  so-called  "semi-industrial
countries," :hat the  interaction  of  unexploited  economies of  scale and
oligopolistic  market  structures  is likely  to  be greatest. 3
A case  in  point  is  Korea. Following  a  drive  to  develop  heavy  and  chemical
industries  in  the  mid 1970s,  Korea  found  itself  with an extremely  concentrated
domestic  industrial  structure  in  the  early  1980s,  when it embarked  on cautious
trade  liberalization.  Government  policies  had  not  only  erected  entry  barriers
into  those  sectors  in  the  hands  of  conglomerates,  but  also  conferred  a  h'gh  level
of protection  from  import  competition.  In  many  ways  Ko..ea  resembles  the  ideal
case  so  often  referred  to  in the  recent  research  on trade  policy  in  imperfectly
competitive  environments.  Indeed  the  evidence  we review  in  this  paper  indicates
that  protection  in sectors  with unexploited  economies  of scale  erected  entry
barriers,  which  in  turn  allowed  firms  to  exploit  market  power. What then  would
be the  effects  of an  across-the-board  trade  liberalization  in  this  environment?
In this paper,  we apply a computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model
developed  in de  Melo  and  Tarr (forthcoming)  to  assess  the  welfare  and  resource3
allocation  effects  of  trade  liberalization  in  Korea.  A CGE  model  is  particularly
relevant  for such an exercise  because  of the relatively  high and dispersed
protection  in  the  Korean  economy,  and  because  of  the  importance  of economies  of
scale  in  several  sectors.  Our  calculations  are  derived  from  a  seven  sector  model
calibrated  to  1982,  a  year  which  has  especially  good  protection  estimates.  Three
sectors  - consumer  goods,  producer  goods,  and  heavy  industry  - are  calibrated  to
increasing  returns  to scale (IRTS).  In some simulations,  in line  i*ith  the
empirical  evidence,  we allow  these  sectors  to earn super-normal  profits  when
protected. To anticipate  our  results,  the  welfare  gains  from a move to free
trade reach  up to 10 percent  of GDP, an estimate  tenfold  larger than the
corresponding  gains  under constant  returns  to scale (CRTS).  Even if,  when
protected,  these  sectors  cannot  earn  above  normal  profits,  our  estimates  of the
welfare  gains  reach  up to  5 percent  of GDP.
Our results  stand  in sharp  contrast  to other  estimates  of the  costs  of
protection,  one  exception  being  the  work of  Harris  (1984)  on  Canada. To  judge
the  plausibility  of these  results,  one  must question  whether  our  model  of the
Korean  industrial  organization  structure  is a reasonable  one.  Therefoee,  in
section  2  we go into  some  detail  on recent  Korean  industrial  organization  and
industrial  policies,  as  we believe  they  provide  good support  for  our  modelling
of  trade  policy  in  the  Korean  environment.  Section  3  discusses  our  modelling  of
imperfectly  competitive  markets  and  how  we calibrated  the  model to 1982  data.
Results  are  in section  4 and  conclusions  follow  in section  5.
2.  Trade  Policies,  Industrial  Structure,  and  Industrial  Organization  Policies
in  Korea
Until  the  move to a sectoral  development  strategy  focusing  on heavy  and
chemical industries  (HCIs)  between 1973 and 1979, Korea's  outward-oriented4
strategy  was predicated  on superior  organizational  ability and emphasis  in
development  of labor-intensive  activities. During  this  early  phase (prior  to
1973),  Korea's  innovative  policies  included  a rationalized  exchange  rate  regime,
strong  export  incentives,  selective  import  liberalization,  directed  credit,  and
a  host  of  finely-tuned  export  promotion  instruments.  A  key  feature  of  that  phase
was  high  protection  of  the  domestic  market  in industries  in  which  Korea  did  not
face favorable international  prospects,  combined with  low protection in
industries  where  Korean  products  were competitive. As a result,  unlike  many
other  countries  following  an active  industrialization  strategy,  Korea  offered
little  incentive  for industries  producing  exportables  to keep them at home.
Examples  of heavily  protected  sectors  (effective  protectiorn  rates  for  1968 in
parenthesis)  were transport  equipment  (163Z),  durable  construction  (64Z),  and
machinery  (44Z).
The  shift  towards  HCIs  was achieved  by directing  to these  sectors  .p to
four-fifths  of manufacturing  investment  credit,  usually  at preferential  rates,
by providing  protection,  and  by encouraging  the development  of conglomerates
(referred  to  as  Jaebol).  These  policies  recognized  that  most  industries  favored
by the HCI drive have large economies  of scale and hence that efficient
production  implied  capacities  well beyond  the scale  of the domestic  market.
However,  this shift  from  a broad,  export-led  strategy  towards  a more typical
sector  orientation  had some  undesirable  side  effects,  including  underutilized
capacity  and a sharp  decline  in the  incremental  output-capital  ratio,  effects
that  eventually  led  to  a  return  toward  greater  industrial  neutrality  and  cautious
import  liberalization  starting  in 1979. Nonetheless,  it shou:d  be recognized
that the  HCI drive achieved  many objectives,  including  the target  of 50% of
export  sales  for  the  HCIs  and  the  successful  transition  to  an  economy  fully  based5
on modern technology  by a leapfrog  strategy  with respect  to technological
requirements  during  che  HCI  drive. 4
A legacy  of the HCI  drive,  however,  has been an extremely  concertrated
industrial  structure  by international  standards  (see  table  la). Fo_  example,
in  1982,  the  top  50  Korean  firms  accounted  for  37  percent  of total  sales,  while
the  corresponding  figure  for  Japan  is  27 percent  for  the  top  100  firms  and  for
Taiwan  16 percent  for  the  top  50 firms. Furthermore,  the  percentage  of sales
classified  as  *competitive"  (three-firm  concentration  ratio  less  than  60Z),  which
has  been  relatively  low  since  1970,  declined  as a result  of the  HCI  drive. 5
Various  factors  led to accelerated  economic  concentration.  Introducing
mass production  techniques  into  a small  domestic  market  at a relatively  early
stage  of  development  allowed  conglomerates  to  accumulate  stocks  of  superior  humnan
and  physical  capital  while  they  were protected  from  domestic  and  international
competition  by  various  institutional  barriers  erected  to  limit  new  entry  into  the
market.  In addition,  sometimes  the government's  economic  policy  intensified
concentration.  During  the  HCI  drive,  overlapping  investment  was  prevented  in  the
most important  industrial  branches. Furthermore,  Lee,  Urata,  and  Choi (1988)
conclude  that  the  protection  and  incentive  policies,  including  taxation,  banking,
and  commercial  policy  measures,  operated  almost  exclusively  to  the  advantage  of
t;;e  conglomerates.
Many  observers  of  Korea  agree  that  conglomerates  exercise  market  power  on
domestic  sales. However,  the  data  in  table  lb  suggest  that  sectors  competing  in
international  markets  (i.e.  sectors  with  high  export  shares  andlor  low  rates  of
protection)  price  more  competitively.6  One  way  of finding  out  if  this  is  so is
by  cross-section  regressions  linking performance  with  structure.  Such
regressions,  traditionally  carried  out  by industrial  organization  economists,6
Table  1:  COMHODITY  MARKET  STRUCTURE  AND  PERFORMANCE  IN KOREAN  MANUFACTURING
(la) Comodity Market  Stzucturea
(1982)
Monopoly  Duopoly  Oligopoly  Competitive Total
Numbes  of  533  251  1.071  405  2260
Commoditiesa  (23.6)  (11.1)  (47.4)  (17.9)  (100)
Sales  5,649  3,275  24,967  15,481  49,372
(billion  won)a  (11.4)  (6.6)  (50.6)  (31.4)  (100)
(lb) Performance  of Different  Market  Structures
(average  of 1978  and  1983)
High  Low
Monopoly/  Less  Export  Export
Oligopoly Competitive  Protected  Protected  Share  Share
Price
Cost
Harginb  0.29  0.26  0.  0.24  0.25  0.29
(Mean)
Note: Monopoly  if  CR1  > 80  percent,  S1/S2  <  10.
Duopoly  if  CR2 >  80  percent,  S1IS2  <  5, S3 <  5  percent.
Oligopoly  if  CR3  >  60 percent  (monopoly  and  duopoly  excluded).
Competitive  if  CR3  >  60  percent.
Where  CRi  indicates  i-firm  concentration  ratio,  and  Si indicates  area
of largest  ith  firm.
a.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  percentaget  totals  sum  to 100.
b.  Percent  *  PCM is  calculated  as  value  of sales  less  labor  costs  divided  by
value  of sales.
Source: Lee,  Urata,  and  Choi (1988),  Tables  3  and  8.attempt  to  isolate  the  effects  of  industry  structure  on  sectoral  average  price  -
cost  margin  (PCMs)  after  controlling  for  other  factors  affecting  the  PCM,  like
differences  in  technology  across  sectors.  In  the  Korean  case,  estimates  by  Lee,
Urata,  and  Choi (1988)  for  65  manufacturing  sectors  for  1983  show  that,  after
controlling  for  capital  intensity,  R&D  expenditures  (and  other  factors),  the  PCM
is  positively  (and  significantly)  related  to  concentration. 7 More  interestingly,
they  also  find  a  statistically  significant  negative  correlation  between  PCMs  and
import  shares  in  domestic  sales,  suggesting  that  imports  exert  a discipline  on
the  pricing  of  domestic  firms. 8 These  authors  also  note  that  the  pace  of import
liberalization  was accelerated  in  markets  dominated  by a few  firms.
Perhaps  the  most telling  indication  that regulation  of market  stru  ture
became  a major concern  for Korean  industrial  policy  comes from the  vigorous
enforcement  of  the  Monopoly  Regulation  Act  enacted  in  1981. About  10  percent  of
firms designated  b) government  as dominating  their respective  markets  were
accused  of having  their  market  position. Administrative  recommendations  and
orders  were issued  to trade  associations  that had clauses  permitting  undue
concerting  activities  in  their  articles  of  incorporation.  Over  two  hundred  cases
in violation  of the provisions  against  unfair  trade  practices  were leveled
between  1981 and 1985.  Moreover,  35 percent  of the 2,600 applications  for
international  agreements  during  this  period  were judged  to contain  provisions
restricting  competition  or involving  unfair trade practices  and had to be
revised.
Two  stylized  facts  emerge  from  this  discussion  and  from  the  data  in  table
1.  First,  Korea appears to have achieved  a very concentrated  industrial
structure  by  the  early  1980s. This  was  a  legacy  of  the  HCI  drive  when  industrial
policy discouraged  firm entry.  Secor  ,  the evidence  suggests  that, after8
controlling  for  other  factors,  highly  protected  sectors  were  earning  above  normal
profits. By creating  barriers  to entry,  protection  alA  wed conglomerates  to
exercise  market power.  These stylized  facts  are incorporated  in the model
outlined  below.
3.  Modelling  Imperfectly  Competitive  Domestic  Markets 9
On the  basis  of  the  evidence  discussed  above,  we concentrate  on  modelling
the implications  of imperfectly  competitive  behavior  in domestic  markets in
sectors  with  IRTS. At the  same  time,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,
we assume  that  Korean  exports  are sold  in competitive  world  markets. We also
assume  that  Korea  is  a small  economy  in the  markets  in  which  it trades. This
implies  that  there  are  no induced  terms-of-trade  effects  from  changes  in trade
policy. While  this  small  country  assumption  may  be debatable  for  a few  export
markets  in  which  Korea  competes,  it  has  the  great  advantage  of simplifying  the
interpretation  of  welfare  calculations  and,  in  any  case,  could  be  relaxed  without
difficulty.
Substitution  possibilities  in production  and demand  are summarized  in
figure  1.  Production  possibilities  are  parametrized  by assuming  CES functions
for  value-added  and Leontief  .unctions  between  intermediates  (as  a  whole)  and
value-added,  as well as within  intermediates. However,  within  each sector,
intermediate  demand is a  CES  function  between the  domestically  produced
intermediate  and the  competing  foreign  intermediate.  To give an example,  no
substitution  is  allowed between consumer goods and producer goods, but
substitution  in  purchases  is  allowed  between  domestically  produced  consumer  goods
and  foreign  produced  consumer  goods  when  their  relative  prices  change  as  a  result
of  a change  in  trade  policy. Likewise  in  Lonsumption  demand,  the  demand  system9
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derived  from the Stone-Geary  utility  indicator  allows  for  non-unitary  income
elasticities  of demand  and  non-zero  cross-price  elasticities  of demand  between
domestically  produced  and  foreign  produced  consumpti-n  good.
Traded  goods  are imperfect  substitutes  by country  of origin.  In each
sector,  goods  produced  domestically  are  imperfect  substitutes  for  Imports. As
in the  case analyzed  by Snape (1977),  changes  in trade  policy  will shift  the
demand  curve  of  domestic  firmq.  Likewise,  goods  supplied  on  the  domestic  market
are imperfect  substitutes  for goods  supplied  for  export.  This assumption  is
maintained  also  for  sectors  with IRTS. In those  sectors,  goods  are  produced  by
Ni ileptical  firms. Thus,  all  goods  produced  for  domestic  sales  in the same
sector  are perfect  substitutes,  allowing  us to aggregate  sectoral  demand  and
supplies.
The  assumption  that  product  differentiation  is modelled  at the  national
level  rather  than at the firm level  has three implications  for the  welfare
estimates  reported  below. First,  '¢cause  all  domestic  firms  are  identical  and
supply  a  homogeneous  product,  one  cannot  capture  product  variety  and  hence  we  may
underestimate  the  benefits  of  trade  liberalization  as  additional  product  variety
occurs.
The  next  two  implications  bear  on  the  monopolistic  competitive  approach  to
modelling  imperfectly  competitive  behavior. The  assumption  of  national  product
differentiation  implies  that  the  domestic  firms'  perceived  elasticity  of  demand
only  depends  on the  number  of  competing  domestic  firms  rather  than  on the  total
number  of competing  firms  in the  world.  Our  numerical  results,  however,  show
that  the  value  of  the  perceived  elasticity  of  demand  is  quite  insensitive  to  firm
entry/exit.  The  other  implication  of  national  product  differentiation  is  that
adjustment  to achieve  zero  profits  occurs  by firm  entry/exit. In the  case of11
firm  entry,  one  gets  market  fragmentation  which  may  overstate scale
inefficien.  .10 If  Korean  firms  are  indeed  "small"  in  the  market  in  which  they
compete,  an increase  in  the  number  of  Korean  firms  would  have  little  effect  on
their  demand. Hence  adjustment  to zero-profits  would occur  by an alternative
mechaaism. One possible  adjustment  is that  which  occurs  when incumbent  firms
price  competitively,  just  covering  average  costs.
In view of these implications  of the national  product  differentiation
sssumption,  we shall  contrast  two  pricing  hypotheses  in  IRTS  sectors  against  the
alternative  of CRTS where marginal cost pricing prevails.  In the first
alternative,  we specify  an analogue  to the  case of perfect  competition  under
CRTS.  We assume costless  entry/exit,  so that the threat of entry forces
incumbent  firms  t#  price  at  average  cost. Omitting  sectoral  subscripts,  in  this
contestable  market  scenario,
(1)  PX  = AC
for  each  sector  with  IRTS,  where  PX  is  the  weighted  sum  of the  unit  sales  prices
on the  domestic  (PD)  and  export  (PE)  markets  (recall  that  in the  export  market
the  unit  sales  price  in  domestic  currency  is  determined  by the  exogenously  given
price  in  foreign  currency  times  the  exchange  rate)  and  AC is  average  costs. This
pricing  rule  represents  only  a small  departure  from  competitive  pricing  and  has
the advantage  of isolating  the role of market  structure  from that of market
conduct.  In  our  simulations  we also  compare  this  to  a fixed  profit  rate  mark-up
pricing  strategy  (defined  below).12
In  the  second  alternative,  we assume  that  each (identical)  firm  behaves  in
.the  domestic  market  as  a  monopolist  facing  a  downward.-sloping  demand  curve. In
equilibrium,  each  firm  equates  marginal  revenue  with  marginal  costs,  i.e.:
(2)  PD - MC  1+0
PD  NE
where  MC is  marginal  cost,  PD is  the  unit  price  on  domestic  sales,  and  e is  the
endogenous  elasticity  of aggregate  sectoral  demand.  The variable  0 is  the
representative  firm's  conjecture  about  the  response  of  competitors  to  its  output
decision  with respect  to firm  J.  That  is,  if Q_  denotes  the  aggregate  output
of the remaining  firms  in its sector,  then 0 - AQ_j/AQj.  We refer  to this
specification  as the  conjectural  variations  case.
For the  functional  forms  selected  to represent  import  demand  and  export
supply,  de Melo and Tarr (forthcoming)  show that the  perceived  elasticity  of
demand  facing  each  firm  is given  by:
(3)  e  - eFSF + evsv
where SF and sV denote  the shares  of final  and intermediate  goods in total
demand,  respectively,  and  eF and  eV  are  functions  of the  parameters  describing
substitution  effects  in intermediate  and  final  demand.
Whereas,  the  threat  of  entry  insures  zero  profits  in  the  contestable  market
alternative,  in  the  conjectural  variation  case  we  have  to  make  assumptions  about
entry  and  exit.  In  one  closure,  we assume  no entry/exit. In the  other,  which13
may be more representative  of a long-run  equilibrium,  entry/exit  ensures  zero
profits,  so the  model  also  includes  explicitly  the  zero  profit  condition:
(4)  1  - 0
where  r  is the  profit  rate.
One  might  expect  the  degree  of firm  collusion  to  vary  with the  number  of
firms. The  fewer  the  number  of  firms,  the  more  collusive  behavior  is likely  to
be. Indeed,  if  N represents  the  number  of firms,  one  would  expect  that  0  *  0  as
N  4  4  so  that  firms  behave  competitively  as  N  becomes  large. In  our  case,  N is
an  arbitrary  number  normalized  to  unity  in  the  calibration.  To  capture  the  idea
that  firm's  conjectures  depend  on  the  number  of firms,  and  more  importantly  to
account  for  the  fact  that  firm  entry  implies  the  availability  of  a  larger  number
of  varieties,  we add  the  following  equation  to  determine  conjectures:
(5)  0 - AQ_j/IQj  - N-1
This  means  that,  as firms  enter  (exit),  incumbents  adapt  their  conjectures  and
price  more (less)  competitively.  Equation  (5)  can  be viewed  as a shortcut  to
account for product  variety and the influence  of the number of firms on
behavior. 11
In light  of the  evidence  in  section  2,  we present  a variant  of the  model
in  which  protection  allows  for  supernormal  profit  because  of  barriers  to  entry.
In the  presence  of supernormal  profits  firms  sell  in the  domestic  market  at a
price PD > PD.  The rate of profit,  #, per unit of domestic  sales,  is an14
exogenous  parameter.  Then,  in  the  mark-up  pricing  case,  equation  (1)  is  replaced
by:
(1') PX (PD,  PE)  - AC (l+t)
which  is  contestable  for  t =  0. In  the  conjectural  variation  case,  equation  (4)
is  replaced  by:
(4')  r  -'
which  sets  the  profit  rate  to  its  exogenously  determined  value. Thus,  we assume
for experimental  purposes  that liberalization  eliminates  the  market  power  of
domestic  firms,  and removing  protection  entails  concurrently  setting  t  =  0 in
equation (1') or  (4').  To control for the effect of entry/exit  in the
conjectural  variations  case,  we also  ran  this  specification  with no entry/exit
under  both  profitability  scenarios.  Altogether,  this  yields  six  alternatives  to
perfect  competition  under CRTS.  Each alternative  entails  a different  model
calibration.
In  the  case  of  normal  initial  profits  (0 - 0),  to incorporate  fixed  costs
while  replicating  observed  prices  and  quantities  in  the  CRTS  case,  we reduce  the
primary  variable  cost  component  of total  costs  by the  amount  of fixed  costs. In
the  case  of  monopolistic  competition,  equation  (2)  is also  solved  to  yield  the
value of the conjecture  0.  This implies  that the conjecture  is in fact
calibrated. 12 Hence  we denote  the  calibrated  conjecture  by a.  The  calibrated
values  of  0  appear  in table  4 below.15
In  the  presence  of supernormal  profits,  we allocate  fixed  costs  as  before
and  then,  given  the  profit  rate  t and  all  quantities  and  foreign  prices,  we solve
for  the  domestic  price  PD  which  satisfy  the  firm's  profitability  constraint. 13
As  before,  the  value  of  n is  obtained  from  equation  (2),  but  with  the  new  set  of
domestic  prices.
Apart from these features,  the CGE model is quite standard.  In this
application  there  are  two  primary  factors labor  and  capital,  which  are  in  fixed
supply,  but mobile between  sectors.  Intersectoral  mobility  leads to equal
rewards  across  sectors  for  each  type  of factor. Domestic  demand  includes  two
components,  final  and  intermediate.  The  government  collects  (and  distributes  in
lump  sum)  revenues  from  tariff  collection.
For the seven sectors  in the present  aggregation,  table 2 gives the
composition  of  sectoral  output,  exports  and  imports.  Also  included  are  estimates
for: (1)  elasticity  of  capital/labor  substitution;  (2)  import  price  elasticities
of demand;  (3)  export  supply  price  elasticities. The last  column  of table  2
gives  the  value  of the  calibrated  price  elasticity  of demand,  e.
4.  Simulation  Results
The  simulations  consist  of  the  abolition  of  the  import  protection  Korea  had
in 1982,  the  year  for  the  most  recent  input-output  table. Column  7 in table  2
gives  the  nominal  tariff  structure  of  Korea  in  that  year. The  protection  rates
reported  here are based on direct  comparisons  of domestic  and international
prices. Hence  they  include  tariff  equivalent  protection  by  existing  non-tariff
measures,  and are as reliable  an estimate  of protection  as one is likely  to
obtain. The  most  notable  feature  of the  tariff  structure  displayed  in  column  4Table 2:  STRUCTURE  OF PRODUCTION,  TRADE.  AND  ELASTICITY  VALUES
Price
Percentag.  Elasticity
Share in  Imports/  Elasticity  of  Export  Import  Nominal  of  Demand
Gross  Exports/  Domestic  Substitution  Supply  a  Elaaticiti  Tartjf  for  Dotic
Output  Output  Sales  In  Production  El.1ticity  of  Demand  Rate  Sales
cX)  (E/X)  (M/D)  (op)  (at)  (ov)  (to)  (a)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (6)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Primary  6.9  4.9  64.4  2.5  0.76  1.8  59.7  --
Food  Processing  9.6  2.5  6.7  1.5  1.6  2.6  18.4  --
Consumer  Goods  14.4  82.6  11.2  1.0  1.6  2.4  16.7  1.49
Producer Goods  20.1  16.6  19.7  0.9  1.6  2.2  17.6  1.30
Heovy  Industry  7.7  31.9  47.8  0.9  1.5  1.9  28.3  1.31
Traded  Services  18.2  24.4  6.1  1.6  1.6  2.0  0.0  --
Non-Traded Services  26.1  --  --  0.9  --
0.4  __  __
a. Incom  compennsted  prico  elasticity  of  export  supply  (import  demand).
b. Nominal  tariff  rate  Includes  an  estimato  of  tariff  equivalent  protoction  conforred  by  existing  non-tariff  barriers.17
is the  high  protection  conferred  on the  primary  sector. This  reflects  Korea's
tradition  of protecting  its  agricultural  sector.
Tables  3 and 4 report  the  aggregate  and sectoral  resource  pull effects
(respectively)  of  removing  protection  under  the  six  market  structure  and  conduct
alternatives  described  above.  To facilitate  interpretation  of results,  we
compare  them  with  those  obtained  under  CRTS. For  the  cases  with  IRTS,  the  three
sectors  with increasing  returns  are  consumer  goods,  producer  goods,  and  heavy
industry.  Simulations  are  for two  sets of paramete: values describing
unexploited  economies  of scale in the base solution.  For the case of low
economies  of scale,  we assume  for  all  three  sectors  a cost-disadvantage  ratio
(CDR) of  0.10, which is thought to be a  conservative  value for Korean
manufacturing.  For the case of medium/high  economies  of  scale,  a  cost-
disadvantage  ratio  of 0.20  is  assumed.  Each  set  of  CDRs  is  applied  to  the  three
pricing  rules  described  earlier. For  profits,  we also  assume  two  alternatives.
In the  first,  normal  profits  (r  = 0)  are  assumed,  regardless  of  whether  or  not
there  is  protection.  In  the  second  case,  in  line  with the  pattern  of  PCM  values
described  in  section  2,  we assume  that  a supernormal  profit  rate  of 10  percent
(I =  10)  is  achievable  under  protection  because  of the  barriers  to  entry  from
restricted  foreign  competition.
Two  measures  of  the  gains/losses  from  removing  protection  are  reported  in
Table  3.  The equivalent  variation  (EV)  measure  is derived  from  the indirect
utility  (IU)  function  associated  with the  Stone-Geary  utility  function  assumed
for final  demand.  EV is an aggregate  measure  of both efficiency  gains in
production  and  in  consumption.  EV  measures  how  much  the  representative  consumer
would  have  to  be  compensated,  at the  new  set  of  prices,  to  be indifferent  to  the
bundle  of  goods  now  available  at the  initial  set  of  prices. The  second  measure18
Tabl-  8:  AGGREGATE  WELFARE  EFFECTS  OF TRADE  LIBERALIZATION
Uark-up  Conjectural  Variations
CRTS  Pricing  No Entry/Exit  Entry/Exit
Column  (1)  (2)  (a)  (4)  (5)  (a)  (7)
Cost  Disadvantage  Ratio*  0.0  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.20
(X  of  Base Year  National  Income)
Equivalent  Variation  (EV)b  1.1
wu  0  2.6  6.3  2.1  4.7  -. 6  22
w =  loX  4.9  10.2  2.5  6.2  1.6  $JD
Scale  Efficiency  Gain (SE)c  0.0
wu  0  1.8  8.4  0.8  3.0  -1.4  15
w a10X  2.0  5.8  0.7  2.6  -. 4  29
a.  CDR  a  1  - MC/AC.
b.  EV  =  C tIU  (Pl,  Y1 9), P 1] - C EIU  (PO,  Yo 0 where C To  the  cost  function  associated  with  tho
Indirect  utility  function  (IU)  corresponding  to  the  LES  utility  function  describing  consumer
Choice.
c.  SE  =  (TC  (PO,  X 0) - TC (Po,  X 1))/GDPO  is  a  vector  of  product  and  factor  prices,  and  GDPO  is
real  CDP prior  to  the removal  of  protection.19
is  the  scale  efficiency  gain/loss  (SE)  from  moving  along  the  average  coat  curve.
Like  EV, SE evaluates  the  new output  level  at old  prices,  so that  the  measure
controls  for  shifts  in  the  average  cost  curve  induced  by changes  in factor  and
product  prices.
Figure  2  illustrates  the  measure  of  scale  efficiency  change  used  in  table
3.  Prior  to removing  protection,  the  observed  cost  output  combination  is (C 0,
X0).  As a result  of the removal  of protection,  relative  product  and factor
prices  change,  leading  to a shift  in the  cost  curve. Consider  two  cases. In
figure  (2a),  there  is  output  expansion,  leading  to  an estimated  scale  efficiency
gain  indicated  by the  shaded  area. In  contrast,  in figure  (2b)  there  is  output
contraction  and, therefore,  a scale  efficiency  loss,  again indicated  by the
shaded  area.  In both cases, the scale efficiency  change is measured by
evaluating  the  cost  function  at  the  initial  vector  of  product  and  factor  prices.
The  measure  (SE)  reported  in  table  3  is  the  sum  of  the  sectoral  gains  and  losses.
Table  3  expresses  both  EV  and  SE  as  a  percentage  of  initial  national  income
(GDP).  In the reference  case of CRTS, liberalization  yields  a 1.1 percent
increase  in  welfare  (column  1).  Because  there  are  no scale  efficiency  effects,
the  welfare  gain  under  CRTS  is the  sum  Qf  the  traditional  producer  and  consumer
surplus  gains  from  removing  distortions.
Now compare  this result  with the corresponding  estimate  under  mark-up
pricing.  In this specification  there is no firm entry,  so scale efficiency
gains/losses  vary  directly  with  sectoral  output.  Sectors  which  expand  (contract)
will  achieve  scale  economy  gains  (losses).  In  the  case  of  no initial  supernormal
profits,  welfare  gains  are  higher  than  under  CRTS  because,  on average,  sectors
with  IRTS expand as a  result of  removing  protection.  This  is  so  because20




xo----Q  X1  Output
Ficure 2b:  SCALE EFFICIENCY LOSS
Average
Cost
C(PX  1Xx 1
x  (  Output21
resources  are  pulled  out  of  the  heavily  protected  primary  sector  into  industry,
where  three  out  of the  five  sectors  have  IRTS.
As  expected,  welfare  gains  are  greater  the  greater  the  degree  of  unrealized
scale  economies. Doubling  the  value  of CDR  approximately  doubles  the  overall
welfare  gain,  although  it  almost  triples  the  associated  scale  efficiency  gains.
Note also that the EV measure  under IRTS is greater  than the sum of the EV
measure  under  CRTS  and  the  corresponding  SE  measure. This  is so because  there
is  a  further  gain  as  average  cost  pricing  comes  closer  to  marginal  cost  pricing.
When  trade  liberalization  eliminates  supernormal  profits  (1  - 102),  welfare
and scale  efficiency  gains  increase  substantially.  This is  one aspect  of the
pro-competitive  effect  of  trade  liberalization  (the  other  appears  in  the  form  of
a higher  elasticity  of demand  in  the  conjectural  variations  model  --  see  table
4).  For  example,  with  the  combination  (CDR  - 102,  X  - 102),  EV - 4.92  of GDP.
Compared  with the  case  of no initial  profits  (EV  - 2.62  of GDP),  the  greater
welfare  gain can be decomposed  into  two components: the first  is the scale
efficiency  gain (2.0Z  versus  1.1Z)  as firms  expand  more because  they can no
longer  price  restrictively.  The  second  component  is again  due  to the  welfare
gains  of pricing  closer  to marginal  costs. This effect  is about  1.8  =  4.9 -
(1.1  +  2.0)  percent  of initial  GDP. In the  not implausible  combination  (CDR
202,  r  =  10Z),  welfare  gains  from trade  liberalization  are estimated  at 10.2
percent  of GDP.
The  case  of conjectural  variations  is  more  complicated,  since  there  are
three  additional  adjustment  mechanisms  that  affect  the  calculated  welfare  gain
measure. First,  there  may be firm  entry/exit  to attain  exogenously  specified
profit  rates. A second  factor  is the  endogeneity  of oligopoly  behavior. As
firms  enter (exit),  incumbents  adapt  their  conjectures  and price less (more)22
competitively.  Third,  but  apparently  less  significant,  is the  pro-competitive
effect  which  is  due  to trade  liberalization  raising  the  elasticity  of sectoral
domestic  demand,  e  (see  table  4).14
Compare  mark-up pricing  and conjectural  variations  with no entry/exit
(cols.  4  and  5). In  the  mark-up  case,  scale  efficiency  gains  are  higher  because
firms  expand  output  to  maintain  or to  achieve  zero  profits. On the  other  hand,
in the  conjectural  variation  specification  with no entry/exit  firms  may make
profits,  realizing  less  scale  efficiency  gains.  At  the  same  time,  higher  profits
in  the  conjectural  variations  case  reduce  welfare  gains  as  prices  diverge  further
from  marginal  costs.  These  two factors  explain  why welfare  gains  are larger
under mark-up pricing.  The larger differen;  e  in welfare gains for the
specification  with positive  profits  in the base, results  from substantially
greater  output  expansion  to achieve  the  necessary  price reductions  after the
removal  of protection.
Now  consider  firm  entry,  which  exerts  a  crowding  effect  that  diminishes  the
overall  scale  efficiency  gain.  This is the  effect  analyzed  in Horstman  and
Markusen  (1986). In the  case  of  CDR  - .10,  this  effect  dominates  the  positive
output  effect  of liberalization  on scale  efficiency,  so that overall scale
efficiency  is reduced.1 5 By contrast,  with CDR  =  .20  average  sectoral  output
expands  more  than  the  firm  population  and  scale  efficiency  is  increased.  In  the
case  of  zero  initial  profits,  the  scale  efficiency  loss  is  large  enough  to  offset
the  other  welfare  gains  from  trade  liberalization.
When  there  are  profits  in  taie  initial  situation,  as  before,  there  is  a  gain
from  moving  closer  to  marginal  cost  pricing  with  trade  liberalization.  However,
two  other  effects  are  also  at  work. On  the  one  hand,  more  firm  entry  is  required
to  eliminate  excess  profits,  with its  deleterious  u'.fect  on scale  efficiency.23
Table  4:  SECTORAL  RESULTS  (COD  .10)
(Percent  Change)
Mark-up  Conjectural  Variations
CRTS  Pricing  No  Entry/Exit  Entry/Exit
0ao  *&lo  t0  ul*0  ea0  io10
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (6)  (C)  (7)
Consumer  Goods  X  12.4  19.0  81.7  10.0  9.4  6.9  227
E  25.1  34.9  S7.9  20.7  21.3  17.4  453
SE  1.0  1.9  0.3  0.3  -1.8  -1
c  0.9  0.9  .8  LA
0  0.2  OA
N  26.8  238
Producer  Goods  X  12.9  17.2  26.5  12.9  10.9  10.1  183
E  40.1  43.2  69.9  39.9  37.8  86.6  SS1
SE  1.6  2.0  0.6  0.4  -1.1  -A
0.2  0.3  .2  2
O  0.2  03
N  21.6  241
Heavy  Industry  X  -1.7  -5.1  8.4  -8.3  -1.7  -S.S  4.3
E  9.7  2.8  23.8  6.9  10.8  4.6  19S
SE  -. 6  .7  -. 1  0.0  -1.8  -10
c  2.6  2.6  2.5  81
0  0.2  03
N  10.7  170
Note: X  =  Gross  output;  E  a  Exports
SE  =  Scale  efficiency  massure  (sm table  8)  expressed  as  a  percent  of  sectoral
sales  at  current  prices.
N  =  Number  of  fires  (initially  set  equal  to  1)
c  *  Elasticity  of  demand  (defined  In  equation  3).
0  ,  Calibrated  conjecture.24
However,  there is a  counter-balancing  effect  as firm entry leads~  to more
competitive  behavior. The  net  result  is  that  scale  efficiency  improves  more  and
that the overall  welfare gain is greater  than in the zero initial  profit
scenario. Since  we have  not  taken  direct  account  of increased  product  variety
on  welfare,  these  results  may  understate  the  benefits  of increased  competition.
Table  4  summarizes  the  microeconomic  results  from  removing  protection  for
the  sectors  with  IRTS  and  a  CDR  value  of 0.10. The  table  also  displays  the  value
of a  which suggest  that  all three  sectors  are  more competitive  than  Cournot.
Fureach  of the  three  sectors  with IRTS,  exports  expand  even  though,  under  most
scenarios,  output  contracts  for  heavy  industry  (the  most  protected  sector  after
agriculture).  The  reason  for  export  expansion  despite  output  contraction  is  that
removing  protection  leads to a real exchange  rate depreciation,  a general
equilibrium  effect.
Consumer  and  producer  goods  follow  similar  patterns:  with  X =  0,  expansion
is greatest  under  mark-up  pricing  and  least  under  conjectural  variations,  with
CRTS  in the  middle. The  reason  for  a stronger  expansion  under  mark-up  pricing
is the  absence  of firm  entry  to impede  the realization  of economies  of scale.
Interestingly,  the  scale  efficiency  loss  caused  by firm entry (the  number  of
firms  increases  by  between  21 and  25  percent)  can  dampen  output  expansion  below
that  achieved  under  CRTS  when  r-0.  Compare  collumns  (6)  and (1)  in the  case  of
consumer  goods,  where  firm  entry  is  greatest  and  scale  efficiency  loss  greatest.
Output  expansion  under  conjectural  variations  is  only  half that  achieved  under
CRTS.  There  are two reasons  for  this smaller  output  expansion. First,  the
higher  price  for  domestic  sales  because  of  less  efficient  scale  means  less  demand
for  domestic  consumer  goods  (and  greater  demand  ror  imported  consumer  goodsl.
Second, because of  interindustry  linkages, under conjectural  variations25
production  costs  go  up  in  sectors  that  are  intensive  purchasers  of  producer  goods
and  heavy  industry.
When  protection  alters  market  structure  by  allowing  for  supernormal  profits
(columns  3 and 5), removing  protection  leads to a magnification  effect  on
resource  pulls.  The magnification  effect is  stronger  under conjectural
variations  for  consumer  and  producer  goods  than  under  mark-up  pricing.  For  heavy
industry,  the (exogenous)  pro-competitive  effect  of eliminating  profits  is
sufficient  to compensate  for  the  negative  resource  pull  effect  of eliminating
protection.  This  example  illustrates  the  possibility  that  sectors  that  would  be
predicted  to contract  because  of liberalization  expand  instead  because  they
become  more competitive. Even in this q'ighly  aggregated  model,  a ranking  of
sectors  in  ascending  order  of  effective  protection  would  thus  not  be  an  accurate
ranking  of comparative  advantage.
The other  pro-competitive  effect  of trade  liberalization  comes  from the
greater  elasticity  of  demand  facing  firms  after  protection  is  eliminated.  For
the  functional  forms  specified  here,  the  results  in table  4 indicate  that  this
effect  is  small. However,  one  cannot  judge  the  likely  importance  of  this  effect
from  the  simulations  reported  here,  since  constant  substitution  elasticities  are
maintained  throughout.  Changes  in  the  values  of  e  are  entirely  accounted  for  by
changes  in import  (and  domestic)  shares  in  final  and  intermediate  demand.
5.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  developed  a  simulation  model  to  evaluate  the  welfare  effects
of  trade l'beralization.  In contrast  with previous general equilibrium
simulation  exercises,  this  paper  decomposes  the  welfare  effects  of  trade  policy
changes  into  its  various  components.  Although  the  calibrated  simulation  exercise26
for  Korea  relies  on judgmental  parameter  values  to represent  demand  and  supply
elasticities,  evidence  on  the  links  between  trade  policies,  industrial  structure,
and industrial  organization  policies  in Korea provide good support  for the
alternative  modelling  approaches  adopted  here.  The  estimated  gains  from  trade
liberalization  were found  to be quite  sensitive  to the specification  of firm
pricing  behaviLr  in the  three  manufacturing  sectors  with IRTS.
In  the  benchmark  case  of  across-the-board  CRTS,  elimination  of  protection
yields a welfare gain of 1.1 percent of GDP.  This gain represents  the
traditional  production  and  consumption  costs  of  protection. Under  IRTS  and  no
firm  entry,  net  scale  efficiency  gains  (scale  efficiency  gains  in  consumer  goods
and  producer  goods  coupled  with scale  efficiency  losses  in  heavy  industry)  give
an additional  gain  between  1.3  and  3.4  percent  of GDP,  depending  on the  extent
of  unrealized  economies  of  scale. If  it  is  recognized,  as  the  evidence  suggests,
tha:  protection  allowed  Korean  conglomerates  to  act  collusively  in their  sales
on the  domestic  market,  one  would  obtain  an  additional  welfare  gain  of between
1.3  and  4.9  percent  of  GDP,  thereby  yielding  a total  gain  of  between  5 percent
of  GDP  if  unexploited  economies  of  scale  are  small,  and  10  percent  of  GDP  if  they
are  in  a  range  commonly  attributed  to  them  in  this  country  (a  cost  disadvantage
ratio  of 20 percent).
Welfare  gain estimates  are, however,  much lower  if the  mark-up  pricing
scenario  is  replaced  by  one  with  conjectural  variations,  even  if  one  recognizes
that  firm  entry/exit  may  occur.  Under  the  conjectural  variations  scenario  where
liberalization  is accompanied  by firm  entry  (the  number  of firms  increases  by
between  10 and  25  percent  in sectors  with  IRTS). Trade  liberalization  results
in scale  efficiency  losses. In some  cases  there  is sufficient  to yield  a net
aggregate  welfare  loss if firms  are  not allowed  to make excess  profits  under27
protection.  If  firms  are  allowed  to earn  supernormal  profits  under  protection,
aggregate  welfare  gains  are  between  1.6  and  6.0  percent  of  GDP.
In the Korean  example,  trade liberalization  would favor  industry  since
agriculture  is  the  most  heavily  protected  sector. In  many  other  semi-industrial
countries,  elimination  of protection  would involve  a  resource  shift out of
manufacturing.  A case  in  point  is  Chile,  where  trade  liberalization  involved  a
relative  expansion  of agriculture.  In this  case,  scale  efficiency  gains  would
only  be  achieved  if  the  elimination  of  protection  were  accompanied  by firm  exit,
and the  scale  efficiency  gains  of trade  liberalization  would be greater  in a
world  of conjectural  variations  than in  one  of mark-up  pricing. However,  the
competitive  effects  of trade  liberalization  could  be even  greater  than those
estimated  here.
It  should  be  apparent  from  this  summary  description  of  the  results  that  the
welfare  cost  estimates  of  protection  are  quite  sensitive  to  the  specification  of
market  structure  and  conduct  and,  in  particular,  to  the  firm  entry/exit  patterns
accompanying  trade  liberalization.  In the  Korean  case,  estimates  of the  gains
from trade liberalization  are much larger  under IRTS than under CRTS, if
inefficient  firm  entry  is forestalled  while  the  competitive  discipline  imposed
by greater  import  competition  is  maintained  on the  domestic  market.28
Notes
1.  Early contributions  include Corden (1967)  and Snape (1977).  Major
contributions  in the  new  literature  are  surveyed  in  Helpman  and  Krugman  (1985,
1989)  and  in  the  edited  volumes  by  Kierkowski  (1984)  and  Krugman  (1988). For  a
recent  survey,  see  Harris  (1989).
2.  See,  for  example,  Dixit  (1988)  and  Venables  and  Smith  (1988).
3.  Developing  country  case studies  include  Bergsman  (1974),  Rodrik  (1988),
Gunasekera  and  Tyers  (1988),  Devarajan  and  Rodrik  (1989a,b),  Condon  and  de  Melo
(1990).
4.  For  further  discussion  of the  HCI  drive  see  World  Bank (1987).
5.  The  market  share  of  the  20  leading  Jaebol  continued  to  rise  until  the  early
1980s.
6.  Mean  price-cost  margins  (PCMs)  for  protected  sectors  were a third  higher
than  for  less  protected  sectors  in 1982.
7.  The  positive  correlation  between  PCM  and  concentration  does  not  necessarily
support  the "structuralist  view"  which sees in this  relationship  rent-seeking
behavior  by  oligopolistic  firms.  It  could  also  reflect  the  superior  performance
of large  firms  according  to the "efficiency-based  view". However,  in the  case
of  Korea,  evidence  indicates  that  the  efficiency  of small  and  medium  sized  firms
had  caught  up  with  that  of large  firms  by the  end  of  the  1970s. See  Kim  (1985).
8.  This result is known as  the "import discipline"  hypothesis  in the
industrial  organization  literature.  See  the  symposia  led  by  Caves  (1980)  and  by
Gerorski  and  Jacquemin  (1981).
9.  For  a fuller  description  of  the  model,  see  de  Melo  and  Tarr  (forthcoming).29
10.  For  an approach  that  relies  on product  differentiation  at the  firm  level
see  Brown  and  Stern  (1989).
11.  While conjectural  variations  are a  convenient  way  of  parametrizing
oligopolistic  behavior  and  suitable  for  a static  simulation  exercise,  they  are
inadequate  to study detailed  interactions  under dynamic  oligopoly.  For a
critique  of the  conjectural  variation  approach  see  Shapiro  (1989).
12.  An  equivalent  approach  is  to  read  in  Cournot  conjectures  and  calibrate  for
Ni,  the  Cournot  equivalent  number  of  firms.  An alternative  (but  in  our  view  less
appealing)  approach  is  to  solve  for  marginal  costs  or  demand  elasticities,  both
of  which  are likely  to  be more reliable  information  than  conjectures. In any
case,  the system  of equations  (2)  and (3)  can only deliver  two  of the three
variable  0,  N, and e.
13.  Because  of interindustry  relationships,  this  calibration  involves  solving
simultaneously  for  the  vector  of domestic  prices,  PD.
14.  This  effect  is  also  discussed  by Devarajan  and  Rodrik  (1989).
15.  The reduction  in scale  efficiency  obtained  here also  occurs  for  certain
parameter  configurations  in the theoretical  models  of Krugman (1984),  Snape
(1977)  and  Venables  (1985).30
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